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Abstract 
Privatisation is contentious but in Myanmar it has not so much been its merits or 
drawbacks that have attracted attention as questions around implementation. In 
Myanmar, the implementation of privatisation has broad significance for the political 
economy. A first phase of privatisation was focused on small to medium-sized 
enterprises and did not have a significant economic impact. A second phase, 
commenced in 2008, consolidated the interests of a business elite with personal 
connections to the military regime. The impact of this second phase of privatisation was 
such that some elements of this elite strengthened to the extent that they no longer relied 
entirely on patronage, creating opportunities for diversification in their strategies of 
wealth creation and defence. For this reason, it is argued, the wealthiest strata of 
Myanmar’s business elite is now best conceived as not simply consisting of cronies but 
rather as a nascent form of oligarchy. In theoretical terms, this suggests that greater 
attention to the qualitative difference between cronyism and oligarchy is warranted, as 
is close study of processes – like privatisation and political reform – that enable or 
require a wider range of strategies of wealth defence. 
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Introduction 
An international shift away from state ownership of utilities and other “strategic assets” 
in the 1980s translated into a marked increase in privatisation in developing countries in 
the 1990s (Parker and Kirkpatrick 2005, 514). Two decades later, it remains a core tenet 
of market-based approaches to economic development. Yet, while privatisation has been 
widely promoted in developing countries, it remains controversial. In a wide-ranging 
review, Birdsall and Nellis (2003) observe that studies that frame privatisation in 
transitional and developing economies as a technical process typically judge them a 
success, based on claimed efficiency gains. As they also suggest, however, many such 
initiatives have resulted in a greater concentration of both assets and income.1 A 
political economy perspective allows for analysis of how and why the benefits of such 
programs are concentrated, providing insight into how power structures associated with 
class, personal and organisational networks, institutional control and so on determine 
the outcomes of processes that purport to be rational and driven by market-based 
competition.  
In Myanmar, privatisation was limited under the domination of a military regime over 
decades of economic and political isolation. It is now a component of a broader process 
of marketization. As a consequence, the emergence of a private sector and of business 
elites has occurred in a distinctive manner. Prior to 1988, under the regime of General 
Ne Win, Myanmar followed the iconoclastic “Burmese Way to Socialism,” adopting 
policies that purported to promote self-sufficiency and economic development through 
import substitution, state ownership and tight control over economic activity. Most of 
Myanmar’s economic and political links with the rest of the world were severed during 
this period and the economy declined dramatically. In 1988, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) ended the rule of General Ne Win and took control of the 
government to quell protests and pro-democracy activism (Callahan 2012, 121).2 
Desperate to salvage what was left of the economy, the SLORC began a program of 
market reform, which included increased openness to foreign investment and economic 
growth in the private sector. Significantly, then, marketisation was entered into as part 
of an attempt to reconstitute and reassert authoritarianism, as both a practical strategy 
(policies to rebuild a failing economy) and a symbolic attempt (economic “reform” 
alongside closed authority structures) to resolve an apparent crisis of state legitimacy.  
The initial push towards market reforms led to local capital formation and business 
development through foreign joint ventures with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
ostensibly private sector enterprises that were linked directly to the military or the 
associates of powerful military personnel. Meanwhile, the imposition of various forms 
of trade sanctions by the United States and the European Union led to a distinctive 
pattern of investment and market engagement by international businesses.3 Despite 
failing to advance economic “reform” across the board, one area in which the regime 
did act was the privatisation of formerly publicly owned or controlled enterprises and 
properties. Alongside access to licences, land and other forms of patronage, 
privatisation allowed for the formation and/or growth of domestic conglomerates whose 
owners typically enjoyed close personal connections with military personnel. Many of 
these individuals now control the largest conglomerates in Myanmar. Their economic 
significance and public profile is evident in the increasing use of the English language 
term “crony” by politically engaged citizens and independent news publications, where 
it serves as a form of shorthand to denote the widespread influence and dominant 
position of these business elites within the economy and society.4  
In this article, we demonstrate that cronies did indeed benefit from structural biases and 
a lack of transparency in the privatisation process. A small number of individuals used 
their personal proximity to powerful governing elites to manipulate the privatisation 
process and secure concessions and near-monopolies. Although privatisation occurred 
in the context of official state policy commitment to market-based reform – ostensibly 
facilitating greater competition and efficiency – it in fact maximised the concentration 
of assets and wealth for these domestic business elites. More importantly, however, the 
massive transfers of wealth associated with a second phase of the privatisation process – 
along with other forms of state patronage associated with marketisation – had a 
fundamental effect on the political economy of Myanmar. While most within the 
business elite have maintained close relationships with well-established governing 
(especially military) elites, these conglomerates are beginning to assert themselves as 
independent actors. In other words, there is evidence that this second phase has 
facilitated a shift from a classic form of cronyism to a nascent form of oligarchy, where 
the latter is distinguished by consolidated economic power and enhanced autonomy 
from their political patrons. Privatisation can thereby be seen as significant in and of 
itself for understanding economic restructuring in Myanmar and for initial signs that a 
capitalist oligarchy may be emerging, as erstwhile cronies begin to consider new 
alliances in order to defend their wealth and influence. 
Privatisation can be defined in a range of ways. Following Parker and Kirkpatrick 
(2005, 514), we limit our definition to “the transfer of productive assets from the state 
sector to the private sector,” which, as Milne (1991, 322–323) suggests, can be achieved 
through sale, leasing or the formation of a joint venture.5 The relationship between 
marketisation and oligarchy is neither predetermined nor uniform, influenced as it is by 
context and by political and social contingencies as well as by economic structure. In 
Myanmar’s case, now that privatisation is largely achieved, the capacity of aspiring 
oligarchs to amass further material wealth is greatly dependent on overcoming barriers 
to foreign direct investment stemming from the pariah status of the former regime. It is 
therefore necessary to think carefully about the means and circumstances by which 
oligarchies are formed and solidified, as well as local and international factors 
influencing strategies of wealth defence. In attempting to do so, we describe and analyse 
successive waves of privatisation, drawing on available data and interviews with 
government officials and several bidders (both winners and losers) for the purchase of 
SOEs, before turning our attention to its impact on the deeper structures of Myanmar’s 
political economy and what this tells us about the relationship between cronyism and 
oligarchy.6 Before this is possible, it is first necessary to explain the difference between 
cronies and oligarchs and provide a comparative perspective on privatisation. 
 
Cronies and Oligarchs 
Understanding the rise of business elites in Myanmar and their articulation with the 
state and processes of market reform requires consideration of the development and 
form of business elites in other nations. Business elites can be conceptualised in various 
ways but the literatures on oligarchy and cronyism are most relevant for our discussion 
of Myanmar. Within the literature on oligarchy, a particularly important point of 
comparison is Indonesia where, as Hadiz and Robison (2013, 38) observe, “capitalism 
was incubated within the state itself,” as highly profitable state monopolies were 
“dismantled and transferred into private hands” and adjustments to state policies such as 
allowing private banks to form and operate unencumbered by meaningful regulatory 
oversight allowed “private conglomerates to mobilize vast new sources of private 
funding for their own enterprises” (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 48).  
In Indonesia, marketisation was implemented by governing elites that had every 
opportunity and incentive either to ensure that crucial economic sectors came under the 
control of their personal associates and clients, or to themselves move into private sector 
business activity. Hadiz and Robison argue that state patronage and concessions 
provided the impetus not only for the formation of ever-more powerful private sector 
business enterprises but for the emergence of a more “oligarchic form” as the families 
of state officials and powerful military officers began to engage directly in business 
activity. Moreover, Indonesia’s oligarchy “sought to consolidate itself not by simply 
negating the rules of the market but by selectively exploiting and expropriating them” 
(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 48). As this suggests, policy adjustments and institutional 
drives towards significant economic “reform” – of which the privatisation of formerly 
state-controlled assets and monopolies are especially significant – can facilitate wealth 
concentration sufficient to consolidate business elites into oligarchy. 
Whereas Hadiz and Robison focus primarily on the role of state and governing elites in 
the accumulation and concentration of wealth, Winters’ (2011, 7) analysis of oligarchy 
focuses on the “politics of wealth defense by materially endowed actors” under different 
ideal types of oligarchy, which he describes as “warring,” “ruling,” “sultanistic” and 
“civil.” Central to these ideal types is the mechanisms of preserving or extending private 
property and property rights, and thus the degree of direct or indirect coercion required 
for defending wealth. Civil oligarchies, for instance, are underpinned by consistent legal 
bureaucratic institutional protections for concentrated wealth but can emerge under both 
democratic and authoritarian forms of governance. Winters’ most developed discussion 
of the relationship between wealth defence and oligarchic form draws on his analysis of 
the “sultanistic” oligarchy that emerged in Indonesia under the Suharto regime, whereby 
a dominant governing oligarch managed and controlled other oligarchs in a personalistic 
but organised system of plunder.  
These conceptualisations of oligarchy have been extremely influential in analyses of the 
political economy of Southeast Asia and of Indonesia in particular (see Ford and 
Pepinsky, 2014). Perhaps even more influential, however, has been the trope of the 
“crony.” Imported from the United States to the Philippines in the mid twentieth 
century, the term “crony capitalism” came to “describe a capitalist economy in which 
contracts, loans, appointments, concessions, subsidies, tax incentives, and so on are 
awarded to friends, relatives and other clientelistic associates” (Kahn and Formosa 
2002, 51). It gained broader currency in the 1980s and 1990s before becoming 
ubiquitous after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when it became a catch-all explanation 
for the failure of so many Asian economies (Kahn and Formosa 2002).7  
What, then, is the relationship between oligarchy and cronyism? Are “oligarch” and 
“crony” merely synonyms? Hutchcroft (1991, 435) makes a useful distinction. For him, 
cronies are “those whose positions are particularly favored by the current regime, 
regardless of their origins.” In other words, these “new men” engaged in the business of 
amassing their fortunes may have been very wealthy beforehand, but may also have had 
non-material assets such as family connections that they leverage in the context of the 
regime. An oligarch, meanwhile – having “already established his or her fortune in 
earlier dispensations” – may or may not be a crony. Developing this distinction in a 
discussion of capitalism in the Philippines, Hutchcroft refers to a specific example of 
“non-crony” oligarchs as benefiting in various ways from state patronage but also as 
holding power and influence that was “not dependent upon any particular regime.” 
Elsewhere he notes that even while engaging in “raids on state resources” the “oligarchy 
retained its firm economic base outside the state” (Hutchcroft 1991, 424).  
What is implicit in Hutchcroft’s analysis is the premise that oligarchs have concentrated 
sufficient wealth and influence so as to be not entirely dependent on patronage; in other 
words, they are able to exercise a degree of relative autonomy from governing or 
bureaucratic elites. This distinction resonates with Winters’ careful accounting of the 
relationship between wealth defence and political power under different ideal types of 
oligarchy. Like Hadiz and Robison, Winters (2011, 138) points to the “incubation” of 
oligarchy through the cultivation of personal connections and forms of patronage, 
observing that these oligarchs “arise at or near the center of the regime, and are 
dependent on their oligarchic incubator sometimes for decades until they develop the 
means to pose challenges.” However, he also notes that the “powerful stratum of 
oligarchs” created by Suharto would “ultimately become independent from him” 
(Winters 2011, 159) – an observation that makes space for the distinction Hutchcroft 
makes between cronies and oligarchs. 
This distinction is even more vital in the case of Myanmar, where there was no domestic 
bourgeoisie to speak of before 1988, and certainly no group that could be identified as 
oligarchs in the sense that the term is used here. The key question, then, in the Myanmar 
case, is not one of state capture by capital, nor one of strategies of wealth defence under 
different political regimes. Rather, it is a question of the mechanism through which 
cronies have been able to build their material assets to such an extent that they begin to 
act independently of their political patrons, namely through privatisation and other 
initiatives associated with marketisation. Before considering these specificities of the 
Myanmar case, however, it is first necessary to examine more generally the links 
between privatisation processes and the role and formation of business elites in other 
contexts. 
Privatisation and Business Elites in Southeast Asia 
Neo-liberal approaches to governance posit privatisation as a rational and apolitical 
process of applying market principles and discipline to inefficiently performing assets 
and enterprises, improving the efficiency of markets by eliminating the “distortions” of 
public ownership and contributing to general welfare through economic growth and 
reducing the fiscal liabilities of the state. As Robison (2004, 407) reminds us, the 
international institutions driving market reform conceive of the state as “a marketplace 
in which predatory officials and vested interests exchange power for rents and divert 
resources from productive employment by private investors.” One of the primary 
mechanisms within this broader “good governance” agenda for limiting corrupt 
officials’ capacity to rent-seek is privatisation.  
An alternative perspective frames privatisation as one of several policies “designed to 
restore or consolidate capitalist class power” within the broader neoliberal political 
project (Harvey, 2010, 10). Neo-liberal projections of the benefits of privatisation  
struggle to disguise the reality that such transfers often result in the greater 
concentration of wealth and economic control for particular privileged classes, most 
especially the large corporations or wealthy individuals best placed to take advantage of 
such processes. In many nations, privatisation has occurred in the context of a broader 
transition from either state capitalism or mixed models of state-managed economic 
development and control towards a more comprehensive market-based economic 
structure. In these circumstances, the shift from extensive state ownership of productive 
assets to private control and ownership is mediated by the ability of dominant classes 
and governing elites to secure the transfer of their political and economic power into an 
emergent or resurgent private sector either via proxies (cronies), through their own 
interventions into private business enterprise, or through collaboration with foreign 
investors. 
An important piece of the privatisation puzzle, then, is the relationship between local 
political and economic elites. Much of the initial wave of developing country 
privatisation involved the sale of public assets to foreign capital. However, it has 
focused on domestic investors in some contexts. In Southeast Asia – but also further 
afield, including Africa and post-socialist Eastern Europe – the transition from state-led 
to market economies has created opportunities for powerful governing elites and their 
associates to establish themselves as market actors via diversified business interests that 
benefited from political patronage. In the Philippines, for example, reforms promoted by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ultimately shored up the 
crony system (Hutchcroft 1991, 434). Similarly, “divestiture abuse” was commonplace 
across sub-Saharan Africa, because of the “limited understanding among international 
donors of the political considerations which underlie most reform activities in the 
region.” As a consequence, it was possible to “manipulate privatisation to the benefit of 
the well-connected few” (Tangri and Mwenda 2001, 132). In Eastern Europe, a similar 
manipulation has played out in a context where the transition to post-socialist 
economies often involved “mass privatisation” that “precipitated state withdrawal and 
pushed countries in the direction of crony or political capitalism” (Hamm et al. 2012, 
318). In Russia, marketisation occurred as a form of “shock therapy” where mass 
privatisations fuel the rapid rise of oligarchs linked to reformed governing political 
elites. There, it has been argued that rather than improving governance, privatisation 
processes, which were introduced alongside electoral competition, actually “created 
incentives for political-economic collusion” (Sharafutdinova 2010, 19).  
When states make a formal commitment to market-driven capitalist development, it 
becomes necessary for them to highlight the purportedly rational, competitive and 
apolitical nature of processes such as privatisation. Yet, as even a brief review of 
privatisation in Southeast Asia demonstrates, these processes are very much political, 
not only in that they are often dominated by powerful political and business elites but 
also because they can directly influence, create or reorder power structures. As 
illustrated by the discussion that follows, privatisation not only has the capacity to 
contribute to the further extension of the power of established oligarchs but, in other 
instances and especially where a society is in the process of economic transition, can 
play a role in the formation and consolidation of oligarchies. 
The first wave of privatisation in Southeast Asia took place from the mid-1980s and 
involved the five original states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). By the end of the 1980s, Singapore and Malaysia had embraced privatisation 
most fully (Milne 1991, 330). Governing elites’ acceptance of the principles of 
privatisation was not, however, unconditional. The primary mode of privatisation 
adopted in Malaysia was one of partial divestment, which allowed the government to 
maintain a majority share and therefore control, while in Singapore public holding 
companies engaged in a form of “rolling privatisation, divesting themselves of some 
assets but reinvesting in others” (Yuen and Wagner 1989, 216). As noted earlier, the 
Indonesian economy also underwent deregulation from the early 1980s, during which 
time state monopolies were opened to the private sector. As part of this process, a “huge 
range of former public monopolies in oil distribution and contracting, power generation, 
telecommunications, toll road and port construction and operation were ... passed, 
usually without public tender, into the hands of the major oligarchs” (Robison 2004, 
409). In Thailand, meanwhile, there was significant resistance to privatisation in the 
1980s, as was also the case in the Philippines.  
A second wave of privatisation occurred in the socialist states of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline 
of communism globally. In Laos and Cambodia, privatisation was prompted by rapidly 
reducing Soviet aid and the loss of trade links with Eastern Europe (Livingstone 1997, 
225). In both cases, leasing rather than outright sale was the dominant mode of 
privatisation (Livingstone 1997, 231-33). Meanwhile, external pressure on the 
governments of capitalist developing Southeast Asia to pursue privatisation remained 
strong during the 1990s, but reached new heights after the Asian financial crisis, when 
the IMF experienced a period of unprecedented influence in Thailand and Indonesia.  
Scholars have questioned the benefits of both waves of privatisation in economic and 
social terms. The ethnicity of beneficiaries was a sensitive and influential issue in the 
first wave of privatisation in Southeast Asia (Yuen and Wagner 1989, 220). In the 
Indonesian and Malaysian cases, the primary concern was the extent to which 
privatisation favoured ethnic Chinese over other groups. Milne (1991, 328) attributes 
the Indonesian government’s initial reluctance to engage in large-scale privatisation, 
and subsequent attempts to mitigate the extent to which the Chinese business 
community benefited, to such concerns. The link between ethnicity and privatisation 
was even more explicit in Malaysia, where it was linked to the New Economic Policy.  
In fact, however, the issue of distribution has broader significance than simply divisions 
along ethnic lines. As Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, 531) note, in developing country 
contexts, “domestic private investment may only be feasible for certain high income 
groups or families, probably from the same elite that controls government.” Not 
surprisingly, then – as Yuen and Wagner (1989) observe citing the cases of Malaysia 
and the Philippines – privatisation has often led to an even higher concentration of 
wealth in the hands of the very few. As they suggest, “In such cases, not only is the 
objective if increased efficiency not met, but a worsening distribution of income and 
wealth is the consequence of privatisation” (Yuen and Wagner 1989, 222). Although 
ethnicity was not the only force at play (Johnson and Milton 2003, 409), privatisation 
initiatives in Malaysia sought to shift the distribution of wealth from Chinese to Malays. 
It also further skewed the distribution of economic resources among the Malay 
population, since access to privatised assets depended not only on financial capacity but 
on political influence (Yuen and Wagner 1989, 220). 
The distributional outcomes of privatisation are related strongly to the role of the state 
and various configurations of political power in Southeast Asian nations. Robison 
(2004, 412) cites the privatisation of energy infrastructure in New Order Indonesia as “a 
quintessential case study” of how privatisation benefits well-connected local business 
people, including in this instance several members of President Suharto’s family. The 
government issued 26 licenses to domestic political and business intermediaries to build 
new power-generation plants at inflated prices, thus effectively serving as a “device for 
the public funding and subsidy of the new private business groups.” Similarly, Yuen 
and Wagner (1989, 220-21) describe a case in Malaysia, where a contract was awarded 
to an insolvent company that had submitted an inflated bid, alleged to be 50% owned by 
the investment arm of the ruling party. In other cases, they note, tenders were not called 
for but rather “beneficiaries [were] chosen on the basis of political and personal 
connections.” In Thailand, the Democrat Party promoted privatisation in line with IMF 
demands, but it was delayed by the Thaksin government, which argued that privatisation 
only benefited foreign investors. When it did move on privatisation, there were claims 
of corruption and nepotism, and it was vigorously opposed (see Brown and Hewison 
2005: 358–374). 
In summary, privatisation processes in the various Southeast Asian nations have been 
shaped by the interaction between this broad neo-liberal public policy goal and the 
specificities of social, political and institutional structures, including the ethnic 
composition of business classes, state development strategies, and the degree of 
influence of international economic institutions. In several instance, these “reform” 
initiatives appear to have reinforced nascent or established oligarchies. In the case of 
Myanmar, privatisation as a process is perhaps similar to that experienced by many of 
these nations, in that the formal procedures and institutional mechanisms for achieving 
privatisation and enhanced competition have been subverted leading to greater 
concentration of wealth. The context of privatisation in Myanmar is nonetheless one 
where these transfers have played an important role not so much in the consolidation of 
a capitalist oligarchy but rather in the early stages of its formation. 
Privatisation in Myanmar: Policies and Processes 
From 1995 until 2011, the SLORC/SPDC implemented a programme of privatisation of 
state assets. The initiation of this programme was in line with the government’s stated 
goal of transitioning from a command to a market-oriented economy. Indeed, in official 
discourse, privatisation has always been framed explicitly as a nation-building project. 
In addition to relieving the state of economic enterprises burdened by debt and 
production inefficiencies, privatisation initiatives were to be carried out “on the basis of 
patriotic spirit” to both promote the “emergence and prosperity of national economic 
enterprises in the hands of the national entrepreneurs” and “prevent monopolisation by a 
private group in distribution of national wealth” (Tun 2002).8  
In practice, however, there was a fundamental contradiction between the intention to 
apply market discipline through competition and promotion of a nationalist economic 
agenda, especially as the structure of governance and power relations predetermined 
incentives and opportunities for governing elites to claim the most valued assets and 
activities for their private benefit. Privatisation was implemented across a broad range 
of sectors including mining, transportation, dam construction, fuel retailing and 
manufacturing. A significant proportion of government landholdings were also sold off, 
often at below market prices. In most cases, the buyers were private business owners or 
emerging business conglomerates with close connections with the ruling elite. In others, 
state assets were purchased by companies linked to the military such as the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Company Ltd (UMEH), a conglomerate owned by the 
Directorate of Defence Procurement and by current and retired military personnel.  
A first phase of privatisation (1995-2007) established broad policy goals and procedures 
but ultimately had limited economic impact. A number of laws and regulations were 
passed between 1988 and 1991 to encourage the involvement of the private sector in 
developing the economy. These laws and regulations focused on improving the 
investment climate, establishing incentives for industrialisation and making it possible 
for private sector actors to operate in Myanmar.9 The decision to embark on a structured 
program of privatisation was then flagged at a seminar entitled “The Transfer of State-
owned Enterprises to the Private Sector” in mid-1994 where a paper prepared by the 
office of strategic studies in the Ministry of Defence set out the objectives, guidelines, 
methods and procedures for the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, as well as the 
details of a Privatisation Commission to be established in the following year (see Office 
of Privatisation Commission 1995). The Privatisation Commission, renamed in April 
2011 as the Privatisation Commission for State Owned Economic Enterprises, had 20 
members and, reflecting the tight control of the military government over the process, 
was chaired by the first secretary of the SPDC (Union of Myanmar 1995). It was tasked 
with the identification and sale of SOEs. 
At the request of the Commission, government ministries were instructed to draw up 
lists of enterprises to be considered for privatisation. A shortlist put together by the 
Commission was then considered by Cabinet before permission to sell through a 
process of sealed bidding was finalised. By December 2002, some 166 SOEs formerly 
under the control of eight government ministries had been privatised. The largest 
numbers of these were cinema halls and the remainder comprised factories, rice mills, 
saw mills and government buildings, while a small number of mills linked to the 
Ministry of Forestry were leased to private businesses rather than sold outright (Tun 
2002). In the case of privatisation in Hungary, Bartlett (1992, 80) identifies three 
principal components: (i) divestiture of large state-owned enterprises; (ii) small-scale 
privatisation (retail, restaurants and other small businesses) and (iii) re-privatisation, or, 
the restitution of private holdings nationalised after the Communist takeover. In the first 
wave of privatisation in Myanmar, the bulk of enterprises were drawn from the second 
category, as relevant ministries retained control over larger enterprises in this first wave 
of privatisation. According to Tun (2002), this was so because of the “lack of sufficient 
capital in the hands of national entrepreneurs,” which meant that there were fewer 
proposals than expected. No doubt key decision makers from various ministries also 
wished to retain many of the larger and more viable enterprises in order to continue 
established patterns of rent-seeking. 
Economists committed to privatisation and other market-oriented policies bemoaned its 
“slow pace” and the risk of retreat to an “old-style command economy” (see Than and 
Thein 2007, 104). Their concerns proved, however, to be unfounded. Many government 
ministries and offices were relocated from Yangon to the newly constructed capital at 
Nay Pyi Daw between late 2005 and 2007. This provided impetus for a new phase of 
privatisation characterised by the accelerated sale of SOEs and public assets, 
commencing with the sale of land and vacant buildings that had formerly housed 
government offices and ministries in Yangon. In the manufacturing sector, in 2008 the 
Privatisation Commission announced the sale of state-owned beverage and ice-
producing factories; bran oil and rice mills; warehouses; cigarette, textile and jute 
factories; and electrical goods firms (The Irrawaddy, April 25, 2008). Table 1 shows 
aggregate figures produced by the Privatisation Commission that show that 560 units 
were transferred to private hands between 2008 and mid-2011, more than double the 
figure for the period to 2007.10 
As these figures indicate, the most prominent element of the second phase involved the 
transfer of government-owned fuel stations to the private sector, comprising 45% of 
total transfers (Myanmar Times, May 17-23, 2010). However, transfers to private 
ownership in the period to 2011 occurred across a wide range of sectors including 
mining, transportation infrastructure, and manufacturing (Turnell 2010b). For instance, 
there were reports that 500 ruby and jade mines located in Shan and Kachin states and 
in the Sagaing and Mandalay Divisions were fully privatised, while 380 small gold 
mines have been either partially or fully privatised (Kaung 2010).  
Table 1: Privatised State Economic Enterprises, 1995-2011 (June) 
 
Source: Office of Privatisation Commission (2011). 
A striking feature of both phases of the privatisation program was the strong emphasis 
on local capital. Buyers of SOEs had to be citizens of Myanmar .11 Guidelines also 
emphasised the importance of the purchaser’s capacity to continue the existing business 
activity of the privatised enterprise. Enterprise units that were profitable were required 
to continue their original business activity after privatisation, but those that were not 
were not subject to that condition (Interview with successful bidder, August 2011). 
Also, when evaluating tenders for state-owned buildings, preference was given to 
bidders already operating a business out of the property to be sold. However, according 
to some business people, this provision was manipulated by powerful interests, who 
Ministry 1995-2007 
2008-
2011 Total Asset Type 
Energy - 251 251 Fuel Stations 
Information 124 16 140 Cinema Halls 
Commerce 25 95 120 Rice Mills, Bran Oil Mills, Warehouses 
Industry 27 79 106 Appliances, Textiles 
Others 46 119 165 - 
Total 222 560 782 - 
submitted tenders jointly with the current occupants (Interviews, August 2011). In some 
instances, the Privatisation Commission also provided financial assistance at 
preferential interest rates to potential purchasers (Interview with Myanmar-based 
economic analyst, August 2011). In the services sector, meanwhile, the Commission 
chose to lease rather than sell some businesses that were considered to be profitable. 
A number of privatisation initiatives were facilitated directly by relevant ministries and 
agencies rather than the Privatisation Commission. For instance, the transfer of 
government-owned properties to private ownership was overseen by the State Properties 
Disposal Committee (Interview with government official, August 2011). Privatisation in 
key sectors such as ports, shipping, aviation and roads also took place through direct 
sale or leasing arrangements. For instance, in 2010 the state-controlled Myanmar Port 
Authority (MPA) launched an initiative to privatise its port terminals in Yangon, with 
the Bo Aung Kyaw terminal transferred to the control of the military controlled UMEH 
(The Irrawaddy, July 7, 2010). Similarly, in 2010 the Transport Ministry initiated the 
transfer of the state-owned shipping company Myanma Five Star to UMEH and the sale 
of a majority share of Myanmar Airways International (MAI) to the Kanbawza group, a 
private conglomerate with well-known patronage links with the military regime (The 
Irrawaddy, February 3, 2010). The government also used a Build, Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) method in infrastructure development projects including port facilities and 
segments of major highways have been leased out to private investors (The Irrawaddy, 
February 26, 2010; Interview with Myanmar-based economic analyst, August 2011). 
The privatisation of road development in Myanmar commenced in 1997 with the 
construction of the first privatised toll roads but accelerated from 2007 with the 
privatisation of five major highways on the basis of BOT arrangements or “maintain, 
operate and transfer” agreements involving seven local entrepreneurs. A further 82 
roads, amounting to 4,500km, were earmarked for similar agreements (Swe 2007). 
As this overview suggests, privatisation in Myanmar has proceeded in an uneven and 
sporadic fashion. The initial phase from the mid-1990s resulted in a relatively limited 
number of SOE transfers and many of these were small to medium enterprises such as 
cinemas and mills. There were problems both in attracting sufficient bidders and in the 
relevant ministries releasing enterprises for the purposes of privatisation, and by the turn 
of the new century the program had petered out. As a consequence, this first phase had 
little impact on the underlying structure of the economy. By contrast, the second phase 
of privatisation from 2008 onwards was much broader in scope and in the number of 
enterprises transferred to private control and featured the prominent participation of 
military-linked companies and leading conglomerates in acquiring prized assets and 
concessions. What, then, motivated this accelerated latter phase of privatisation? How 
was the process manipulated to the benefit of business elites? And what was its broader 
significance?  
Privatisation and the Consolidation of Wealth 
The official discourse that privatisation was motivated by the desire to rid government 
of the burden of certain loss-making SOEs should not be entirely ignored. The problems 
of SOEs have certainly been widely acknowledged. Turnell (2010a, 34-35) suggests that 
SOEs are “notoriously inefficient” and represent “a significant drain on government 
finances,” arguing that properly conducted privatisation could generate much-needed 
revenues and assist “fiscal consolidation.” Similar claims were made by government 
officials interviewed for this study, who asserted that the structural economic 
deficiencies of SOEs necessitated privatisation to improve their efficiency and 
competitiveness. In particular, they suggested that SOEs were operating at less than full 
capacity, with inefficient use of inputs and insufficient capital investment to allow for 
the modernisation of their operations (Interviews, August 2011).  
Such accounts do not, however, explain the broad scope and intensification of 
Myanmar’s second phase of privatisation and its significance for the consolidation of 
economic power. A political interpretation of this second privatisation push suggests the 
regime’s motivations were related less to a desire for economic efficiency and more to 
concerns about the implications of the November 2010 general election. The election 
may well have provided a number of potential motives for privatisation – not least 
because the expensive campaign promises of the government-backed Union Solidarity 
and Development Party generated significant demand for funds. In the words of one 
businessperson, “the military government wanted to change its uniform… It wanted 
money to fund its political campaign, and it wanted money when they get back in the 
government” (Interview, August 2011). 
But, while such an argument is broadly plausible, it is unlikely that the government 
would make such an extensive effort to court votes when victory for the ruling party 
was virtually pre-determined. More convincingly, it has been claimed that the regime 
has been motivated by a desire to cement its control over the business sector by 
transferring ownership of the nation’s core economic assets to their business associates 
prior to the November 2010 election. According to International Crisis Group (2010, 8), 
the 2010 elections presaged “major institutional reorganisation and a significant shake-
up in [these] patronage networks, leading to uncertainties about the availability of 
economic rents for current power-holders.” Turnell (2010b, 153), meanwhile, suggests 
that the wave was driven by the desire to “create opportunities for economic rent-
seeking by Myanmar’s present leadership while (pre-election) they possessed the 
unequivocal coercive authority to do so.”12  
Certainly, a notable aspect of Myanmar’s second phase of privatisation has been its 
opaque nature in terms of process. The relevant ministries and the Privatisation 
Commission did not release comprehensive information on the price or terms of 
transfers to the private sector and the names of successful bidders. As noted above, the 
programme was premised on requirements for the new private owners to continue the 
“same kind of economic activity,” presumably to discourage acquisition for the 
purposes of asset stripping, and especially important given the high value of the land on 
which many enterprises were situated. However, there was also the capacity to vary 
such conditions on a case by case basis depending on the “requirements of the state” 
(Tun 2002). Such exceptions foster collusion between powerful government figures and 
their personal business associates.  
Moreover, the architecture of Myanmar’s trading system favours large businesses and 
enhances their ability to take advantage of opportunities arising from the privatisation 
process. For example, only firms with export credits (either via their own exports or via 
purchased credits from other firms) are permitted to import goods. Large businesses are 
the only enterprises with the capacity to earn or to buy export credits from smaller 
players in sufficient volume to then import commodities such as fuel. Effectively, this 
creates conditions that foster cartel-like arrangements where large companies can 
dominate imports of key commodities and which then are in a position to take 
advantage of SOE sales in the same sector, a feature which has been especially evident 
in the sale of fuel retailing outlets.13 Similarly, in the rice market, the government has 
encouraged the formation of large companies for the specialised handling of rice and 
rice mills (Interview with a successful bidder, August 2011). Many of these businesses 
are owned by individuals with close personal and business connections with the highest 
levels of the ruling elite, as evidenced by their subjection to sanctions by the US 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which began 
targeting the well-connected elite families and their conglomerates in 2007 (United 
States Treasury 2008).  
The most prominent of these politically connected conglomerates is the Htoo Group of 
Companies, which includes a bank, an airline, hotels, mines and construction businesses 
(Forbes, September 28, 2011). The owner of the group, U Tay Za, has been identified as 
one of the most significant purchasers of state enterprises in the second round of 
privatisation. The close connections between U Tay Za and several powerful generals, 
including with the Chairman of the SPDC, General Than Shwe, are well known. 
Privatised assets purchased by Htoo have included government properties in Yangon 
and other major cities and the award of contracts to construct two hydro power projects. 
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, Htoo and the military-owned UMEH were 
given permission to import fuel to help in the rebuilding of the affected areas (The 
Irrawady, January 27, 2010). That the privately-owned Htoo was awarded the right to 
import fuel, which has been under the strict control of the government since a socialist 
government took control of the nation in 1962, is indicative of the significance of the 
company’s role in plans for the nation’s economy. Htoo also bought a significant 
number of privatised fuel retail outlets (The Irrawaddy, February 3, 2010). Companies 
directly linked to the military or the ruling party also purchased 31 fuel stations acquired 
by the UMEH and the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a business linked 
to the ruling party, in 2010 (see lists of privatised fuel outlets in The Voice Journal, 34, 
July 2010 and 36, August 2010).  
The involvement of military and ruling party enterprises in the fuel sector was 
symptomatic of a much broader pattern whereby the largest and most potentially 
lucrative assets were not subject to standard process but were instead transferred to the 
control of the military or their close business associates. This practice was an open 
secret. According to one businessperson: 
 
For small [SOEs], the government went through a proper tendering process ... But 
when it comes to big properties and big projects, only handpicked big businesses 
were awarded the privatisation deals … Around eight big companies have bought 
roughly 80% of privatised businesses so far. There is enough to go round among 
the eight conglomerates; they cooperate, they get on well with each other. They 
are in different industry sectors (Interview, August 2011).  
An industry association official confirmed that “there are many examples of secretly 
transferring profitable business firms to their close friends without public 
announcements. For example, everyone wanted to buy the soft drink factory but such 
factory was secretly handed over to their own men.” Reflecting on this approach, he 
concluded that “Privatisation should be carried out in a transparent and fair way. It 
should be real privatisation not pocketisation” (Interview, August 2011). Government 
officials also felt that the scepticism about the accelerated sale of SOEs was well 
founded in that so many prized assets had been transferred to businesses either owned 
by or linked to the military: “When privatisation is carried out, it should proceed 
according to the system of privatisation scheme. Transferring ownership to UMEH and 
MEC [Myanmar Economic Corporation] does not mean real privatisation. It is a backup 
for the business of the armed forces (Interview, August 2011). This assessment was 
supported by an economic analyst based in Yangon, who noted that assets were 
sometimes only available to select buyers, particularly after sealed bids were 
supplemented by sales by negotiation (Interview, August 2011). This was the case in the 
sale of fuel retail outlets. The Commission made a decision, ostensibly as a response to 
the overwhelming volume of applications to purchase fuel stations, to supplement 
sealed bidding with sale by negotiation, which openly created space for special deals 
with preferred buyers.  
Additional concerns have been expressed about inadequate disclosure of information 
and reporting of outcomes. Several informants noted the difficulties faced in putting 
together a credible tender in the absence of information about the value of assets, the 
inaccuracy of inventory lists, and the short timelines between the opening of a tender 
and submission dates (Interviews, August 2011). As a consequence, tender processes 
were plagued by speculation on the part of bidders intent on securing assets, especially 
property, for resale (Interview with a successful tenderer for a government property, 
August 2011). The limited transparency of tender processes was thought by many 
interviewees to have undermined public support and confidence in privatisation and 
similar economic reforms. 
More generally, several interviewees pointed to the expanded scope of privatisation and 
the compressed time period in which the transfers occurred. There were also concerns 
about the management of the process and the way in which a supposedly market-
building process became a mechanism for the extension and consolidation of oligarchic 
power. Importantly, however, this consolidation of economic power occurred in an 
increasingly dynamic political context. In the wake of the 2010 elections, market 
reforms entered a new phase whereby the context of governance has shifted and where 
all economic and political actors must begin to adjust their strategies.  
Business Elites and the New Regime  
The changes in governance associated with political transition have required domestic 
business elites to adapt their strategies in order to defend or extend their wealth. The 
very significant changes that have occurred – including the return of the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) to formal status – have attracted widespread commentary 
on the motives for reform, its implementation and its limits (Jones, 2014; Turnell, 
2010b). It is beyond the scope of this article to survey and assess the reforms, but it is 
clear that there are both continuities and discontinuities between the old and new 
regimes. The implications of the continuities are important. However, they do not 
negate the significance of the changes that have occurred. As Callahan (2012, 120) has 
argued, “although there has been no major shift in the characteristics of those who hold 
top government posts … there exists a new political fluidity that has changed how they 
rule.”  
Most observers have noted that political reform has affected economic management and 
policy. The International Crisis Group (2012) concludes that the “rules of the game” 
have changed in fundamental ways. While acknowledging that personal connections are 
still important for business, its report suggests that “decisions are now more likely to be 
made by technocrats” and that a “new climate of political openness” is enabling greater 
transparency, competition and an enhanced role for foreign investment (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, 6). Of key importance here are the responses of business elites in 
this period of transition, which highlight the salience of the conceptual distinction 
between “cronies” reliant exclusively on patronage and personal association and 
“oligarchs” who may or may not benefit from patronage but who are sufficiently 
wealthy and established so as to exercise independent power. 
A crucial dimension of the new economic policy-making environment is the interaction 
between the government of Myanmar and international institutional actors, which has 
led to the possibility of greater international economic integration. This can be observed 
in shifts in the governance of economic policy-making, including consultation and 
collaboration with the IMF and other external authorities. In 2012, after extensive 
consultation with international economic institutions, the government developed a 
“Framework for Economic and Social Reforms” (FESR), which set out policy priorities 
for the economy up to 2015. The FESR generally conforms, at least rhetorically, to the 
neo-liberal policy prescriptions favoured by the IMF and World Bank. For instance, it 
affirms the pursuit of “quick wins” through the “restructuring of government 
operations” entailing, among other measures, further privatisation measures “so that the 
government can keep its fiscal regime in order and develop regulatory policies 
necessary to foster private investment” (Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2012, 7).  
As part of its collaboration with these international organisations, the government 
promised significant improvements to the transparency of privatisation processes, 
inclusive of open tendering, valuation procedures and competition policies (Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar, 2012: 24). One of the implications of these policy settings is 
that there may be greater scope for international capital to participate in privatisation. 
This has been evident with the award of contracts for the development of 
telecommunication networks to two foreign bidders, although delays in the issuing of 
licenses and regulatory requirements have generated concern in the international 
business press (The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2013). The foreign bidders are to 
compete against two Myanmar-based firms granted licenses to develop networks, one of 
which is a joint venture between the state-owned Myanmar Posts and 
Telecommunications and the military-controlled conglomerate MEC (Myanmar Times, 
July 31, 2013). As the process plays out, the extent to which the latter can use formal 
and informal influence at various institutional levels to stymie foreign competitors will 
be closely observed as a test case for managing risk associated with foreign direct 
investment in Myanmar.14 
These developments suggest a balance between imperatives for reform and 
liberalisation and the ongoing role of established and even military-controlled business 
conglomerates, reflected in the more cautious view of some analysts concerning the 
extent to which reforms have fostered actual change. Jones (2014, 24), for instance, has 
suggested that “structural constraints” such as the continued centrality of the military 
and the unresolved politics of the nation’s borderlands continue to shape and limit the 
scope for political reform. In the economic sphere, meanwhile, he highlights the 
persistence of “crony capitalism,” arguing that the prospects of reformed economic 
management and policy are likely to be “constrained by dominant interests.” Our 
analysis supports this assessment in so far that, following such substantial wealth 
transfers through privatisation and other means, the prospect of the emergence of a 
“level playing field” where conglomerates established under the military regime may 
have to play a “diminished role” (International Crisis Group, 2012, 6, 9) is very 
unlikely. However, the Myanmar case calls for a more dynamic conception of the 
internal composition and characteristics of business elites than offered by Jones, who 
uses the terms “oligarch” and “crony” interchangeably and does not consider the fact 
that the resources amassed by some conglomerate owners means that they are no longer 
exclusively reliant upon a select group of military patrons in their exercise of influence 
and power. 
The prospect of the rapid internationalisation of the economy has created incentives for 
nascent oligarchs to begin to assert this relative autonomy and reposition themselves 
politically in order to defend and/or extend their wealth. Several of Myanmar’s 
wealthiest businessmen remain under sanctions imposed by the United States 
government, via a list of “specially designated nationals” (SDN) not approved for 
business engagement. The centrality of domestic conglomerates within Myanmar’s 
economy means that isolating them via sanctions is near impossible, as was evident in 
February 2013 when United States-owned businesses were licensed by their own 
government to access banking services and develop commercial partnerships with banks 
controlled by individuals on the SDN list.15 However, this designation remains an 
impediment to their ambitions for the internationalisation of their business activities and 
their ability to access global finance and collaborate with international capital in 
Myanmar (The Irrawaddy, January 28, 2013; Associated Press, June 2, 2013; Myanmar 
Times, July 29, 2013). Tay Za from the Htoo Group, for example, has spoken publicly 
about his frustration in being unable to find a suitable foreign business partner to expand 
and redevelop his extensive holdings of resorts and hotels as a result of his inclusion on 
the SDN list (Forbes, September, 2011).  
It is perhaps not surprising then that various business conglomerates and identities have 
sought to rehabilitate their image and even to attempt to distance themselves from their 
past and current reliance on military patronage (The Irrawaddy, January 28, 2013). Tay 
Za and U Zaw Zaw of the Max Myanmar Group have been the most prominent 
individuals to do so. In several media interviews they have acknowledged – yet sought 
to downplay – their personal support and connections with the military, emphasising 
their apparently new-found sympathy for democracy and activism.16 U Zaw Zaw has 
also indicated that his Max Myanmar group of companies was restructuring its business 
strategy to reduce dependence on government-awarded construction projects, instead 
prioritising tourism, finance and services (The Irrawaddy, July 31, 2012), and even 
pledged to return some plots of land where questions had been raised over the legality 
of their acquisition (DVB Multimedia Group, June 25, 2013). Many conglomerates that 
benefitted from the second phase of privatisation have also increased their commitment 
to corporate social responsibility initiatives and contributions to charitable foundations 
in an attempt to legitimise their role in Myanmar’s economy and society (The 
Irrawaddy, January 28, 2013; The Irrawaddy, September 10, 2013). Moreover, in at 
least one instance the owner of a major conglomerate has publicly criticised the 
decision-making of a senior official in the former military regime. In an interview with 
Forbes Asia, Serge Pun, who controls the SPA and First Myanmar Investment Group 
(see Table 2), was reported as representing himself as a “principled businessman who 
says no to corruption and isn’t afraid to make enemies” (Forbes Asia, September 2, 
2013). 
Such manoeuvres are clearly self-serving. They also reveal the incentives for, and 
capacity of, such business elites to engage more autonomously in the political sphere. In 
other words, the opening up of space for civil society and electoral politics has not only 
allowed for critical discussion of the role and the dominance of “cronies” but created 
new avenues through which they can engage in the politics of wealth defence. These 
conglomerates and their high-profile owners, along with several other firms, have 
sought to build relationships with opposition parties, most significantly the NLD. 
Indeed, the latter was criticised in January 2013 for accepting donations from “crony” 
firms for party-controlled charitable trusts working in health and education. Aung San 
Suu Kyi responded not only by defending the donations, which she said would be used 
for good purposes, but by arguing that businesses that had benefited from cronyism 
should be given an opportunity to “reform” (Eleven Myanmar, January 10, 2013; The 
Irrawaddy, January 11, 2013). The efforts of high-profile individuals like Tay Za and 
Zaw Zaw to cultivate a relationship with the NLD, including public appearances by the 
latter with Aung San Suu Kyi, have reportedly caused anger amongst some senior 
military personnel (Zaw 2013; The Irrawaddy, September 10, 2013). This has not 
deterred them from pursuing this strategy while also taking up opportunities to exert 
influence on the business regulation and economic policy settings of the Thein Sein 
government in order to maintain or extend the strength of their business holdings (The 
Irrawaddy, February 24, 2014). 
None of this is to suggest that Myanmar’s business elites are genuinely committed to 
democracy and/or enhanced capacity for political expression in civil society, nor that 
they do not continue to maintain – and prosper from – various personal affiliations with 
governing elites. Rather, the manoeuvres described above support Winters’ description 
of oligarchy as wealth defence in a variety of state formations and regime types. Thus 
while these individuals are widely referred to in popular discourse as “cronies,” they are 
in fact now best described as nascent oligarchs, since they are clearly no longer reliant 
on a sole patron-client relationship. As we have shown, this transformation has occurred 
because of internal and external incentives to do so but also because of the consolidation 
of their economic power and presence through privatisation and other means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Min and Kudo (2014); Din (2011); Prager-Nyein (2014); various company websites; 
United States Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals List. Accessed May 20, 2014. 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.  
Note: The table lists ten major business groups but these are not ranked by size or revenue as 
reliable comparative financial data is not available. The table is not a comprehensive list of 
significant business conglomerates but rather follows Min and Kudo (2014) in selecting 
business groups that are within the top income and commercial taxpayer lists published by the 
Internal Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance. 
Conclusion 
Privatisation, typically presented by its advocates as a rational and objective process 
that builds and extends the reach of markets or even a broader process of transition 
towards a market-based economy, can also serve a political purpose. Market rationales 
for the privatisation of state-controlled assets in Myanmar were not irrelevant in so far 
that some SOEs have suffered from widely recognised problems. What is more 
significant, however, is that the ostensibly market-supporting process of privatisation 
not only provided an opportunity for powerful governing and business elites to absorb 
many of the most profitable assets and business sectors, but resulted in the fundamental  
transformation of the country’s political economy.  
Claims with regard to the precise nature of the juncture between political reform and 
these accelerated economic transfers remain speculative given the difficulty of 
establishing a definitive causal link between the two processes. It is clear, however, that 
privatisation has contributed to a fundamental shift in the relationship between 
Myanmar’s political elites and their erstwhile cronies. As we have suggested here, 
privatisation has consolidated the power of a business elite to the point that they are no 
longer mere “proxies of the military regime” (International Crisis Group, 2012, 9). 
While most continue to benefit from personal associations and patronage they are no 
longer so entirely dependent on this for the accumulation of wealth or for its defence. 
Moreover, within the context of transitions in governance they now have incentives and 
motives for asserting themselves directly as political actors. In short, Myanmar’s 
business elites now have the opportunity to actively influence political process rather 
than simply relying from the channelling of resources as a consequence of dependent 
relationships with military personnel. The fact that privatisation, along with other 
marketisation initiatives, has been both a process of economic restructuring and a 
mechanism for the emergence and consolidation of a form of capitalist oligarchic 
influence is thus highly significant not only for Myanmar’s economy, but also for its 
political landscape. 
The implications of this process are fundamental, as they signal a transition from the 
political economy of cronyism to the political economy of wealth defence. It is by no 
means certain that all Myanmar’s nascent oligarchs will successfully navigate the 
politics of wealth defence in this new context. Some may in fact fail to adapt to an 
environment where unadulterated cronyism no longer guarantees wealth accumulation. 
The extent to which international sanctions, civil society activism or political 
mobilisation may mediate the power and wealth of these oligarchs is also far from pre-
determined. What is clear, however, from our analysis is that further theorisation of the 
relationship between oligarchy and capitalist development is required to support greater 
nuance and clarity in empirical discussions of the seeming dependence of “cronies” and 
the relative autonomy of “oligarchs” in transitional polities like Myanmar. Our analysis 
also points to the need for further research on the conditions under which transitions 
occur within business elites, most especially at the point at which massive wealth 
accumulation enables a crony to transform the power relationship with his or her 
erstwhile patron and the significance of shifts in governance and politics in requiring 
them to do so. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 World Bank studies of privatisation acknowledge that little is known about distributional effects of 
privatisation (Bourguignon and Sepulveda 2009, 1). 
2 The SLORC recast itself as the “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC) in 1997 and was 
dissolved by an official decree in March 2011. 
3 Sanctions led to a select group of Asian nations dominating investment as well as various informal 
mechanisms for subverting the sanctions regime such as widespread yet technically illegal border trade 
with nations such as Thailand. For details see Thein and Pick (2009, 45-48). 
4 The use of the term “crony” was widespread among activists, journalists and others interviewed in a 
separate round of interviews in Myanmar in January 2013. There is no doubt that the term is in wider 
usage with citizens with some familiarity with the English language and with English language media but 
it would appear to be a term that is extending itself into local use. See also Denyer (2013) for the growing 
use of the term. 
5 For overviews of the first wave of privatisation in Southeast Asia, see Yuen and Wagner (1989) and 
Milne (1991). For a comparative overview of the different models of privatisation adopted in East 
Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, see Bartlett (1992). 
6 Fifteen interviews were conducted with businesspeople, economists and government officials from 
relevant ministries based in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw (the new capital city) in August 2011. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic, the names of the participants and the specific dates of the interviews are not 
included in the text. Htwe-Htwe Thein was responsible for the collection of interview data. 
7 For discussions of whether cronyism is always detrimental, see Kahn and Formosa (2002) but also Li 
(2009) and Sajó (2003). 
8 Tun is the Director of the Project Appraisal and Progress Reporting Department in the Ministry of 
National Planning and Economic Development. He set out both these underlying principles of the first 
phase in a paper presented at a regional group of experts meeting on privatisation in Brunei in December 
2002. 
9 Relevant laws included the Foreign Investment Law (1988); the Myanmar Tourism Law (1990); the 
Private Industrial Enterprise Law (1990); the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law (1990); and the 
Promotion of Cottage Industries Law (1991). Moves were also made to establish industrial zones around 
Yangon and Mandalay and to re-establish the Union of Myanmar Chambers of Commerce & Industry in 
1989. Government policies and their implementation were characterised by most international economic 
observers as inconsistent, confusing and ineffective which detracted from market-led development. See, 
for instance, McCarthy (2000). 
10 According to a local media report, the government released figures that suggest that 2009 was the year 
in which the largest number (300) of enterprise privatisations took place during this period (Eleven 
Myanmar, January 16, 2013).  
11 Requirements favouring national capital are not restricted to countries like Myanmar. Bartlett (1992), 
for example, reports that there was an evident bias towards West German capital in the privatisation of 
East German assets. Similarly Livingstone (1997, 232) notes that, in addition to restrictions on foreign 
ownership of state land, considerations included the political impact of the involvement of foreign, but 
especially Thai, interests. In the case of Myanmar, according to one government official, it was not 
unknown for foreign investors to silently partner with a Myanmar national to circumvent the regulation 
(Interview, August 2011). 
 
                                                     
                                                                                                                                                           
12 A slight variation of interpretation places more emphasis on the possible decentralisation of power and 
authority structures envisaged by the 2008 Constitution where leaders of the various states and divisions 
throughout Myanmar were to be granted enhanced control over the assets located in their respective 
geographic areas. According to some analysts, this concern was a key motivator in the government’s rush 
to privatise businesses, most especially in resource sectors such as mining and hydro-power (Kaung 2010; 
International Crisis Group 2010). 
13 In January 2010, the Fuel Oil Importers and Distributors Association (FOIDA) was formed as an 
association vested with the responsibility of overseeing the importation, distribution and pricing of fuel 
including gasoline and diesel. The association was dominated by prominent businesses and owners linked 
to the military regime (The Irrawaddy, January 27, 2010). 
14 While there are SOEs that continue to have a monopoly over key sectors such as power generation and 
oil and gas, in many industries the role and significance of SOEs has diminished considerably as a 
consequence of privatisation (International Monetary Fund 2012, 9-10).  
15 In February 2013 the United States Treasury department issued General Licence No.19, which allowed 
for the partial circumvention of sanctions so that United States-owned businesses could access banking 
services from four Myanmar banks, two of which (Asia Green Development Bank and Ayeyarwady 
Bank) are owned by high profile businessmen: Tay Za and U Zaw Zaw. 
16 For relevant interviews with Tay Za see Forbes, September 28, 2011, The Washington Times, May 19, 
2011; and The Irrawaddy, January 28, 2013. For interviews with Zaw Zaw see Associated Press, June 2, 
2013; Reuters, 12 April, 2012; and The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2013. 
 
